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Nuclear security is a fundamental part of the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) and a key area of assessment for the regulators.

The Office for Nuclear Regulation undertakes this assessment, based on our security submissions, to make an informed judgement as to the suitability of the UK HPR1000 security design and confirm that it meets the high standards required in the UK.

At the end of Step 2 we submitted three documents to the regulators:

The GSR details the generic security mitigation measures which will seek to prevent the theft or sabotage of nuclear or other radioactive materials, as well as the sabotage of a UK HPR1000 nuclear power station. It is the nuclear security case for the UK HPR1000 and sets out the nuclear security ‘story’ of the design. Its assessment will provide the regulators with confidence that the security elements of the design meet the high standards required in the UK by our nuclear regulators.

The GSR (together with the PCSR and PCER) will be progressed at each subsequent step of the GDA process, and we will submit further iterations to the regulators at the end of Step 3 and Step 4. This development process takes a holistic approach to protective measures: physical protection, personnel security, cyber security and information assurance.

The generic security design is then developed further by the licensee (the company authorised to construct and/or operate a nuclear power station) in accordance with the requirements of the specific site for construction. Factors, such as the local geography, could influence some of the security measures required in addition to the generic design. Thus, the GSR is the baseline document for the licensee to produce its Nuclear Site Security Plan (NSSP) which is specific to the site.

The GSR will include details such as the categorisation of Nuclear Material (NM), Other Radioactive Material (ORM) and sources for theft and sabotage, the identification of Vital Areas (VAs) and the methodology used for this analysis. It will use the UK Design Basis Threat (DBT) as its hypothesised baseline threat to inform the analysis and vulnerability assessments, with the outcome being the identification of appropriate protection for the UK HPR1000’s assets and Vital Areas.

As a result of the approach detailed above, the GSR will include the physical protection in place, access control measures, cyber security and defence in depth applied at all times to satisfy the security and safety requirements.

Elements such as the UK DBT must remain classified and be treated as such. This means that some sections of the reports which contain classified information must be redacted before they are published on our website.